assess the military's latest intelligencegathering technologies, says Philip Coyle, a senior adviser for the Center for Defense Information, who spent seven years as director of the Pentagon's Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate. By scrutinizing media coverage and the defence department's public statements, Coyle hopes to study the success of technologies aimed at telling smart bombs where to strike, such as the new computerized command and control systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Postol and Lewis, meanwhile, will be seeking clues about the performance of the Patriot missile interceptor. After the first Gulf War, the MIT team conducted a frameby-frame analysis of 33 Patriot intercept attempts to determine the altitude, speed and outcome of each engagement. "We were able to get an enormous amount of information from the footage," says Postol. Their analysis showed that at least a third of the Patriots fired during the first Gulf War failed to destroy a Scud missile -demolishing the army's initial claims of a 96% success rate for the system. This time the MIT researchers plan to videotape hours of news coverage to track the latest generation of Patriot missiles, known as the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). Unlike the original Patriots, which used explosives to blow up incoming missiles, the PAC-3 destroys warheads by the sheer force of its collision with them. This 'hit-to-kill' technology is also the basis of the first-generation US ballistic-missile defence system being built in Alaska, heightening interest in the system's performance. Already, the army's central command says that four Iraqi missiles have been intercepted by the PAC-3 system. Some analysts complain that, even as the Pentagon opens up the battlefield to the press -assigning some 500 reporters to US military units -it is shutting down other data sources. Earlier this year, for example, the US administration began classifying missiledefence test data (see Nature 417, 777; 2002). John Pike, head of Washington-based Globalsecurity.org, says that he used to use commercial satellite images to analyse military activity, but when US troops entered Afghanistan in 2001, the United States bought all of the images so that no one could access them. It is unclear whether the administration will follow a similar course during the present conflict with Iraq, he says.
"The data are getting worse and worse," says Arkin. Nonetheless, Lewis says that his team will continue to scour hours of news coverage to find hints about how weapons are performing. "It's more important than ever to do this because this administration has become so secretive," he says. The topic first surfaced on 5 February, when US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the House Armed Services Committee that he was looking for ways to allow commanders in the field to use riotcontrol agents, and implied he would seek presidential approval for such measures.
The United States has a legal framework that could permit such action. After the Vietnam War, the then President, Gerald Ford, ruled that chemical riot-control agents, such as tear-gas, could be used in certain circumstances but only with permission from the White House. One such situation would be to disperse civilians that enemy troops were using as a human shield.
The White House has not said whether such permission has been sought for the current conflict. The Pentagon confirms that chemical smoke and pepper spray have been used in previous conflicts, but declines to say what has been supplied to units in Iraq.
Some observers contend that US forces
